The influence of sleep on subjective well-being: An experience sampling study.

Previous research has associated sleep with subjective well-being (SWB), but less is known about the underlying within-person processes. In the current study, we investigated how self-reported and actigraphy-measured sleep parameters (sleep onset latency, sleep duration, sleep satisfaction, social jetlag, and sleep efficiency) influence SWB (positive affect [PA], negative affect [NA], and life satisfaction [LS]) at the within- and between-person levels. Multilevel analyses of data from 109 university students who completed a 2-week experience sampling study revealed that higher within-person sleep satisfaction was a significant predictor of all three components of next day's SWB (ps < .005). Higher between-person sleep satisfaction was also related to higher levels of PA and LS (ps < .005), whereas shorter self-reported between-person sleep onset latency was associated with higher PA and LS, and lower NA (ps < .05). However, longer actigraphy-measured within-person sleep onset latency was associated with higher next day's LS (p = .028). When including within- and between-person sleep parameters into the same models predicting SWB, only within- and between-person sleep satisfaction remained a significant predictor of all components of SWB. Additionally, we found an effect of higher self-reported within-person sleep onset latency on PA and of shorter self-reported within-person sleep duration on LS (ps < .05). Our results indicate that the evaluative component of sleep-sleep satisfaction-is most consistently linked with SWB. Thus, sleep interventions that are successful in not only altering sleep patterns but also enhancing sleep satisfaction may stand a better chance at improving students' SWB. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Replicability and reproducibility of predictive models for diagnosis of depression among young adults using Electronic Health Records.

BACKGROUND: Recent advances in machine learning combined with the growing availability of digitized health records offer new opportunities for improving early diagnosis of depression. An emerging body of research shows that Electronic Health Records can be used to accurately predict cases of depression on the basis of individual's primary care records. The successes of these studies are undeniable, but there is a growing concern that their results may not be replicable, which could cast doubt on their clinical usefulness. METHODS: To address this issue in the present paper, we set out to reproduce and replicate the work by Nichols et al. (2018), who trained predictive models of depression among young adults using Electronic Healthcare Records. Our contribution consists of three parts. First, we attempt to replicate the methodology used by the original authors, acquiring a more up-to-date set of primary health care records to the same specification and reproducing their data processing and analysis. Second, we test models presented in the original paper on our own data, thus providing out-of-sample prediction of the predictive models. Third, we extend past work by considering several novel machine-learning approaches in an attempt to improve the predictive accuracy achieved in the original work. RESULTS: In summary, our results demonstrate that the work of Nichols et al. is largely reproducible and replicable. This was the case both for the replication of the original model and the out-of-sample replication applying NRCBM coefficients to our new EHRs data. Although alternative predictive models did not improve model performance over standard logistic regression, our results indicate that stepwise variable selection is not stable even in the case of large data sets. CONCLUSION: We discuss the challenges associated with the research on mental health and Electronic Health Records, including the need to produce interpretable and robust models. We demonstrated some potential issues associated with the reliance on EHRs, including changes in the regulations and guidelines (such as the QOF guidelines in the UK) and reliance on visits to GP as a predictor of specific disorders.

Are logical intuitions only make-believe? Reexamining the logic-liking effect.

An ongoing debate in the literature on human reasoning concerns whether or not the logical status (valid vs. invalid) of an argument can be intuitively detected. The finding that conclusions of logically valid inferences are liked more compared to conclusions of logically invalid ones-called the logic-liking effect-is one of the most prominent pieces of evidence in support of this notion. Trippas et al. (2016) found this logic-liking effect for different kinds of inferences, including conditional and categorical syllogisms. However, all invalid conclusions presented by Trippas et al. (2016) were also impossible given the premises and had a particular structure of surface features-that is, an incongruent atmosphere. We present new data from five preregistered experiments in which we replicate the effect reported by Trippas et al. (2016) for conditional and categorical syllogisms but show that this effect is eliminated when controlling for confounds in surface features. Moreover, we present evidence that there is a demand effect at play, which suggests that people are deliberately considering atmosphere cues of an argument to inform their liking ratings. Taken together, the findings of the present study cast doubt on the existence of logical intuitions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Impact of the "when the fun stops, stop" gambling message on online gambling behaviour: a randomised, online experimental study.

BACKGROUND: Safer gambling messages are a common freedom-preserving method of protecting individuals from gambling-related harm. Yet, there is little independent and rigorous evidence assessing the effectiveness of safer gambling messages. In our study, we aimed to test the effect of the historically most commonly-used UK safer gambling message on concurrent gambling behaviour of people who gamble in the UK. METHODS: In this study, three preregistered, incentivised, and randomised online experiments, testing the UK's "when the fun stops, stop" message, were carried out via the crowdsourcing platform Prolific. Adults based in the UK who had previously participated in the gambling activities relevant to each experiment were eligible to participate. Experiments 1 and 3 involved bets on real soccer events, and experiment 2 used a commercially available online roulette game. Safer gambling message presence was varied between participants in each experiment. In experiment 2, exposed participants could be shown either a yellow or a black-and-white version of the safer gambling message. Participants were provided with a monetary endowment with which they were allowed to bet. Any of this money not bet was afterwards paid to participants as a bonus, in addition to the payouts from any winning bets. In experiment 2 participants had the opportunity to re-wager any winnings from the roulette game. The primary outcome in experiment 1 was participants' decisions to accept (or reject) a series of football bets, which varied in their specificity (and payoffs), and the primary outcomes of experiments 2 and 3 were the proportion of available funds bet, which were defined as the total amount of money bet by a participant out of the total that could have been bet. FINDINGS: Participants for all three experiments were recruited between May 17, 2019, and Oct 17, 2020. Of the 506 participants in experiment 1, 41·3% of available bets were made by the 254 participants in the gambling message condition, which was not significantly different (p=0·15, odds ratio 1·22 [95% CI 0·93 to 1·61]) to the 37·8% of available bets made by the 252 participants in the control condition. In experiment 2, the only credible difference between conditions was that the 501 participants in the condition with the yellow version of the gambling message bet 3·64% (95% Bayesian credibility interval 0·00% to 7·27%) more of available funds left over than the 499 participants in the control condition. There were no credible differences between the bets made by the 500 participants in the black-and-white gambling message condition and the other conditions. In experiment 3, there were no credible differences between the 502 participants in the gambling message condition and the 501 participants in the control condition, with the largest effect being a 5·87% (95% Bayesian credibility interval -1·44% to 13·20%) increase in the probability of betting everything in the gambling message condition. INTERPRETATION: In our study, no evidence was found for a protective effect of the most common UK safer gambling message. Alternative interventions should be considered as part of an evidence-based public health approach to reducing gambling-related harm. FUNDING: University of Warwick, British Academy and Leverhume, Swiss National Science Foundation.

A speed-of-play limit reduces gambling expenditure in an online roulette game: Results of an online experiment.

UK online casino games are presently not subject to any limitations on speed-of-play or stakes. One recent policy proposal is to ensure that no online casino game can be played faster than its in-person equivalent. Another policy proposal is to limit the maximum stakes on online casino games to £2, to match the current stake limit on electronic gambling machines. This research experimentally investigated the speed-of-play proposal subject to a £2 stake limit, in an online experiment using incentivized payouts based on £4 endowments and a commercial online roulette game, which was slowed-down in one condition to enforce a speed-of-play limit of one spin every 60 seconds. UK residents, aged 18 years and over and with experience in playing online roulette (N = 1,002), were recruited from an online crowdsourcing panel. In the slowed-down condition there was a credible reduction in the amount gambled. This effect occurred via a credible reduction in the mean number of spins which outweighed any potential increases in bet sizes. Speed-of-play limits may be effective in reducing gambling expenditure for online roulette.

Testing the foundations of signal detection theory in recognition memory.

Signal detection theory (SDT) plays a central role in the characterization of human judgments in a wide range of domains, most prominently in recognition memory. But despite its success, many of its fundamental properties are often misunderstood, especially when it comes to its testability. The present work examines five main properties that are characteristic of existing SDT models of recognition memory: (a) random-scale representation, (b) latent-variable independence, (c) likelihood-ratio monotonicity, (d) ROC function asymmetry, and (e) nonthreshold representation. In each case, we establish testable consequences and test them against data collected in the appropriately designed recognition-memory experiment. We also discuss the connection between yes-no, forced-choice, and ranking judgments. This connection introduces additional behavioral constraints and yields an alternative method of reconstructing yes-no ROC functions. Overall, the reported results provide a strong empirical foundation for SDT modeling in recognition memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development.

Young children often struggle to answer the question "what would have happened?" particularly in cases where the adult-like "correct" answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what to change and what to keep fixed when comparing counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, most developmental studies on counterfactual reasoning have relied on binary yes/no responses to counterfactual questions about complex narratives and so have only been able to document when these failures occur but not why and how. Here, we investigate counterfactual reasoning in a domain in which specific counterfactual possibilities are very concrete: simple collision interactions. In Experiment 1, we show that 5- to 10-year-old children (recruited from schools and museums in Connecticut) succeed in making predictions but struggle to answer binary counterfactual questions. In Experiment 2, we use a multiple-choice method to allow children to select a specific counterfactual possibility. We find evidence that 4- to 6-year-old children (recruited online from across the United States) do conduct counterfactual simulations, but the counterfactual possibilities younger children consider differ from adult-like reasoning in systematic ways. Experiment 3 provides further evidence that young children engage in simulation rather than using a simpler visual matching strategy. Together, these experiments show that the developmental changes in counterfactual reasoning are not simply a matter of whether children engage in counterfactual simulation but also how they do so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Bias in confidence: A critical test for discrete-state models of change detection.

Ongoing discussions on the nature of storage in visual working memory have mostly focused on 2 theoretical accounts: On one hand we have a discrete-state account, postulating that information in working memory is supported with high fidelity for a limited number of discrete items by a given number of "slots," with no information being retained beyond these. In contrast with this all-or-nothing view, we have a continuous account arguing that information can be degraded in a continuous manner, reflecting the amount of resources dedicated to each item. It turns out that the core tenets of this discrete-state account constrain the way individuals can express confidence in their judgments, excluding the possibility of biased confidence judgments. Importantly, these biased judgments are expected when assuming a continuous degradation of information. We report 2 studies showing that biased confidence judgments can be reliably observed, a behavioral signature that rejects a large number of discrete-state models. Finally, complementary modeling analyses support the notion of a mixture account, according to which memory-based confidence judgments (in contrast with guesses) are based on a comparison between graded, fallible representations, and response criteria. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Intraindividual Variability and Temporal Stability of Mid-Sleep on Free and Workdays.

People differ in their sleep timings that are often referred to as a chronotype and can be operationalized as mid-sleep (midpoint between sleep onset and wake-up). The aims of the present studies were to examine intraindividual variability and longer-term temporal stability of mid-sleep on free and workdays, while also considering the effect of age. We used data from a 2-week experience sampling study of British university students (Study 1) and from a panel study of Estonian adults who filled in the Munich Chronotype Questionnaire twice up to 5 years apart (Study 2). Results of Study 1 showed that roughly 50% of the variance in daily mid-sleep scores across the 14-day period was attributed to intraindividual variability as indicated by the intraclass correlation coefficient. However, when the effect of free versus workdays was considered, the intraindividual variability in daily mid-sleep across 2 weeks was 0.71 the size of the interindividual variability. In Study 2, mid-sleep on free and workdays showed good levels of temporal stability-the retest correlations of mid-sleep on free and workdays were 0.66 and 0.58 when measured twice over a period of 0-1 to 5 years. The retest stability of mid-sleep scores on both free and workdays sharply increased from young adulthood and reached their peak when participants were in late 40 to early 50 years of age, indicating that age influences the stability of mid-sleep. Future long-term longitudinal studies are necessary to explore how age-related life circumstances and other possible factors may influence the intraindividual variability and temporal stability of mid-sleep.

A linear threshold model for optimal stopping behavior.

In many real-life decisions, options are distributed in space and time, making it necessary to search sequentially through them, often without a chance to return to a rejected option. The optimal strategy in these tasks is to choose the first option that is above a threshold that depends on the current position in the sequence. The implicit decision-making strategies by humans vary but largely diverge from this optimal strategy. The reasons for this divergence remain unknown. We present a model of human stopping decisions in sequential decision-making tasks based on a linear threshold heuristic. The first two studies demonstrate that the linear threshold model accounts better for sequential decision making than existing models. Moreover, we show that the model accurately predicts participants' search behavior in different environments. In the third study, we confirm that the model generalizes to a real-world problem, thus providing an important step toward understanding human sequential decision making.

Two distinct mechanisms of selection in working memory: Additive last-item and retro-cue benefits.

In working memory research, individual items are sometimes said to be in the "focus of attention". According to one view, this occurs for the last item in a sequentially presented list (last-item benefit). According to a second view, this occurs when items are externally cued during the retention interval (retro-cue benefit). We investigated both phenomena at the same time to determine whether both result from the same cognitive mechanisms. If that were the case, retro-cue benefits should be reduced when the retro-cue is directed to the item that already benefits from being presented last. We measured speed-accuracy-tradeoff functions with the response-deadline paradigm to measure retrieval dynamics in a short-term recognition task. Across three experiments, we found that retro-cues benefited the last item and other items to the same extent. The additivity of the last-item benefit and the retro-cue benefit points towards the co-existence of at least two distinct forms of attentional prioritization in working memory.

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data.

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.'s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former's methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N = 993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT's generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.

The effects of refreshing and elaboration on working memory performance, and their contributions to long-term memory formation.

Refreshing and elaboration are cognitive processes assumed to underlie verbal working-memory maintenance and assumed to support long-term memory formation. Whereas refreshing refers to the attentional focussing on representations, elaboration refers to linking representations in working memory into existing semantic networks. We measured the impact of instructed refreshing and elaboration on working and long-term memory separately, and investigated to what extent both processes are distinct in their contributions to working as well as long-term memory. Compared with a no-processing baseline, immediate memory was improved by repeating the items, but not by refreshing them. There was no credible effect of elaboration on working memory, except when items were repeated at the same time. Long-term memory benefited from elaboration, but not from refreshing the words. The results replicate the long-term memory benefit for elaboration, but do not support its beneficial role for working memory. Further, refreshing preserves immediate memory, but does not improve it beyond the level achieved without any processing.

Conditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential theory.

Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related conditionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as "If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4"). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our theory's "principle of relevant inference" and "principle of bounded inference," highlighting the dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.

Forgetting emotional material in working memory.

Proactive interference (PI) is the tendency for information learned earlier to interfere with more recently learned information. In the present study, we induced PI by presenting items from the same category over several trials. This results in a build-up of PI and reduces the discriminability of the items in each subsequent trial. We introduced emotional (e.g. disgust) and neutral (e.g. furniture) categories and examined how increasing levels of PI affected performance for both stimulus types. Participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) performing a 5-item probe recognition task. We modeled responses and corresponding response times with a hierarchical diffusion model. Results showed that PI effects on latent processes (i.e. reduced drift rate) were similar for both stimulus types, but the effect of PI on drift rate was less pronounced PI for emotional compared to neutral stimuli. The decline in the drift rate was accompanied by an increase in neural activation in parahippocampal regions and this relationship was more strongly observed for neutral stimuli compared to emotional stimuli.

Relevance and Reason Relations.

This paper examines precursors and consequents of perceived relevance of a proposition A for a proposition C. In Experiment 1, we test Spohn's (2012) assumption that ∆P = P(C|A) - P(C|~A) is a good predictor of ratings of perceived relevance and reason relations, and we examine whether it is a better predictor than the difference measure (P(C|A) - P(C)). In Experiment 2, we examine the effects of relevance on probabilistic coherence in Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over's (2015) uncertain "and-to-if" inferences. The results suggest that ∆P predicts perceived relevance and reason relations better than the difference measure and that participants are either less probabilistically coherent in "and-to-if" inferences than initially assumed or that they do not follow P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) ("the Equation"). Results are discussed in light of recent results suggesting that the Equation may not hold under conditions of irrelevance or negative relevance.

Probabilistic conditional reasoning: Disentangling form and content with the dual-source model.

The present research examines descriptive models of probabilistic conditional reasoning, that is of reasoning from uncertain conditionals with contents about which reasoners have rich background knowledge. According to our dual-source model, two types of information shape such reasoning: knowledge-based information elicited by the contents of the material and content-independent information derived from the form of inferences. Two experiments implemented manipulations that selectively influenced the model parameters for the knowledge-based information, the relative weight given to form-based versus knowledge-based information, and the parameters for the form-based information, validating the psychological interpretation of these parameters. We apply the model to classical suppression effects dissecting them into effects on background knowledge and effects on form-based processes (Exp. 3) and we use it to reanalyse previous studies manipulating reasoning instructions. In a model-comparison exercise, based on data of seven studies, the dual-source model outperformed three Bayesian competitor models. Overall, our results support the view that people make use of background knowledge in line with current Bayesian models, but they also suggest that the form of the conditional argument, irrespective of its content, plays a substantive, yet smaller, role.